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2Abstract
How can we understand the varied ways in which gender assumptions underpin welfare 
states across Europe and how they are changing?  Do the Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism encapsulate differences between gender regimes, or do we need a more 
targeted gender analysis, differentiating male breadwinner from dual earner models? And 
how do these models relate to those post-state socialist countries which have joined the 
EU since 2004? In academic debate and political reality, ‘Europe’ has tended to mean 
‘Western Europe’; but 10 of the 27 member states are now former state socialist 
countries, with profoundly different social, political and gender histories from those in 
Western countries. One argument is of a shift in Western Europe towards women’s 
increasing labour market participation, away from a male breadwinner model, albeit in 
most countries more a one-and-a-half model and far from gender equality, and at most a 
one-and-three quarter. Another sees post-state socialist countries ‘re-traditionalising’ 
towards a male breadwinner model, as supports for mothers in the labour market have 
been reduced under social and economic transformation since 1989. Does this mean that 
there are contrasting trajectories East and West? Or should they be better seen as 
converging, in the context of economic and social change and European Union policy? 
This chapter will argue that both theoretical approaches shed light on gender regimes in 
Europe, and on changes to them. Unpacking the male breadwinner model into component 
parts (paid work, care work, income, time, power) allows us to understand the way that 
gender has been at the heart of gender inequality in male breadwinner systems in Western 
Europe, and how – to different degrees – regimes have supported a move from the male 
breadwinner system towards gender equality in paid and unpaid work, income, time and 
power. In practice, the social democratic regimes have supported gender equality and the 
move away from the male breadwinner model much more positively than other regimes, 
albeit all 27 members have signed up to the European Union’s gender policy. A more 
collective approach, including social support for children and for childcare, has 
underpinned policies for gender equality. Some countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
have retained social welfare systems which support gender equality, particularly through 
supports to motherhood, despite the move from state socialism, and through periods of 
social and economic turbulence. Systems of state support for gender equality, in 
particular through supporting the social costs of children and care, are at the heart of the 
success of the Scandinavian social democratic states as the most gender equal welfare 
states in the European Union, and – to a lesser extent - in some parts of Central and 
Eastern Europe which were formerly under state socialist domination.
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How can we understand the varied ways in which gender assumptions underpin welfare 
states across Europe, how they are changing and the implications for gender equality? 
Gender equality is an important goal at the EU level, and member states (and other 
European nations) are committed to it. But the 27 states of the current European Union 
have contrasting histories and contemporary gender systems: in particular, gender models 
in former state socialist countries, where women’s employment was strongly socially and 
economically supported, contrast with many Western European countries, where 
women’s dependence on a male breadwinner has been a norm of gender inequality 
entrenched in social assumptions and social legislation. Are European welfare states 
becoming more gender equal or less? And which welfare states offer the best model for 
gender equality?
Across Europe, gender regimes - seen as the key policy logics of welfare states in relation 
to gender - have been challenged by transformations in families, in economies and 
polities. The male breadwinner model, which was a core underpinning principle of most 
Western European welfare states in the post-war era, has been undermined by women’s 
increasing labour market participation: in the EU 15 countries together the employment 
rate (albeit measuring a very low level of one hour per week) rose over the decade from 
1995 to 2005 from 49.7% to 57.4%, a trend which was shared by all the EU 15 members 
(Eurostat structural indicators). Women have joined the labour market, whether or not 
supported by government policies. In those countries with a stronger male breadwinner 
tradition, such as the UK, women’s joining the labour market has taken place with little 
social support and fragmented childcare services (Lewis 2003, Land 2004). But even in 
the social democratic countries of Scandinavia, policies for support have often lagged 
behind women’s needs and demands for childcare, resulting in a deeply divided labour 
market: this disadvantages women in paid work and pensions, and discourages men’s 
participation in childcare (Leira 2006).
Most of all, the decline of marriage, and increase in births outside marriage undermine a 
male breadwinner system, which depended on low rates of divorce and illegitimacy
(Creighton 1999). While these trends show changes in the social constitution of families 
in practice, the male breadwinner ideal has also declined (Lewis 2001a and b, 2002). 
Changes in families – increases in cohabitation and divorce, decreases in marriage and 
fertility – are also trends in common, though they started earlier in Scandinavian 
countries and have reached different points in different places. In post-state socialist 
countries, these trends are strongest in the Baltic States, and weakest in Poland (Pascall & 
Kwak 2005).
The dual earner model in those major parts of Europe which were dominated by state 
socialism has been challenged by the transformation. Under state socialism, women’s 
labour was supported by government, through education, workplace nurseries, parental 
leave and benefits and kindergartens. Women’s employment was effectively supported, 
producing very high levels of participation (around 80% in some countries at the point of 
transition) and low gender pay gaps (UNICEF 1999). While legislation about marriage 
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the development of a women’s movement and protected a gendered domestic division of 
labour. State socialist regimes therefore enhanced gender equality in employment and 
public life, while inhibiting it at home (Ferge 1998).
The transformation brought democratic freedom to the former state socialist regimes, but 
it also brought insecurity, inequality, and immediate losses of GDP and employment for 
both men and women. Gender regimes in the soviet era were built on very high levels of 
public expenditure around 55% in the Central European countries, reducing now to 
around 45% (UNICEF 2001). This brings reduced public spending on most social 
systems, including childcare, and more varied welfare instruments (Ferge and Tausz 
2002). It has also brought changes in ideology, with room for doubt about the appropriate 
role of the state, reducing the legitimacy of the collective spending which supported 
women’s employment and childcare.
Commentators have feared ‘re-traditionalization’ in post-state socialist countries, with 
male breadwinning prioritised over women’s, and over gender equality. Transition may 
bring both continuity and change in gender relations (Einhorn 2006: 95). Four decades of 
state socialist government might be expected to leave some residue in gender 
assumptions, even after transformation, while democratization has also brought 
divergence. Poland and Slovenia could be seen as the most extreme, with Catholic 
influence in Poland, bringing limits to abortion and some government pressures towards 
traditional motherhood, whereas Slovenia’s 90 days’ paternity leave and several 
indicators suggest a more gender equal tendency. The argument here is that post-state 
socialist countries – even Poland - are not going back to the past, but developing 
something new.
Gender in EU social policy
Should we expect to see increasing gender equality as a result EU policy and widening 
membership? Gender equality has been widely acknowledged as an important EU goal.
The early commitment to equal pay for men and women, built into the Treaty of Rome in 
1957, has developed into an employment strategy concerned with increasing women’s 
participation. Directives on Part-time work, Working Time and Parental Leave, and more 
recently work-life balance policies and childcare targets show a concern with the 
domestic gender inequalities that underpin employment inequalities. At the Millenium,
the Council and Ministers for Employment and Social Policy gave support to a ‘new 
social contract on gender’ which supported development of policies for ‘equality of men 
and women in the public and private domains’ (Council of the European Union 2000).
All these may suggest a widening and deepening of EU concern with gender inequalities, 
bringing concern with gender equality at home as well as in employment. But the 
meaning of gender policy developments for member states, and for women in member 
states, is a matter for serious debate. Some see the Open Method of Co-ordination as 
bringing a new development of the social in Europe, bringing shared social objectives 
(Atkinson 2003), while others ask whether the Open Method of Co-ordination, which has 
replaced the legally binding directives, means that EU social objectives are becoming 
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deepening gender policy, they may also be interpreted as serving an economic agenda, 
with increasing women’s employment prioritized over gender equality at home or in 
employment. And while a narrow focus on equal opportunities, or work/family 
reconciliation may lead to a positive assessment of EU policy for women and for gender 
equality, a wider lens may interpret these policies as serving a market agenda rather than 
a social justice one (Lewis 2006b).
The weaker economic situation of transition countries, the socio-economic situation of 
women, its degradation in transformation, and declining fertility are common features of 
former soviet countries (European Commission 2004: 108), as is the freedom now to 
develop civil society. We may ask whether EU membership will protect policies which 
have supported women’s position in the labour market, while widening concerns with
gender equality in family, civil society and polity too?
In the attached tables, EU 27 data are given, where available, to cover the twenty-seven 
EU countries, including very recent accessions, Bulgaria and Romania. The 
Scandinavian, or Nordic countries are represented by Sweden and Denmark, the post-
state socialist countries by Slovenia, Hungary and Poland, the Western European 
continental countries by France and Germany, and countries with a strong male 
breadwinner tradition by Ireland, the UK and Malta. Among European countries which 
are not EU members, EFTA countries are included in the published indicators: Norway 
and Iceland share much with those Social Democratic countries which are EU members, 
while Switzerland is more similar to its continental neighbours.
Gender in comparative frameworks
The characterisation of gender regimes based on the male breadwinner/dual earner 
spectrum (Lewis 1992) puts gender at the centre of comparative analysis and is a starting 
point here. Gender regimes are understood as systems of gender equality or inequality 
through which paid work is connected to unpaid, state services and benefits are delivered 
to individuals or households, costs are allocated, and time is shared between men and 
women in households as well as between households and employment. The decline of the 
male breadwinner model has widespread implications (Creighton 1999, Lewis 2001a, 
2001b). The decline of state support for dual earner arrangements in the new CEE 
member states is also momentous (Pascall and Lewis 2004, Pascall and Kwak 2005, 
Einhorn 2006). European welfare states are analysed here in component parts of the male 
breadwinner/dual earner spectrum: paid work, care work, income, time and power, asking 
to what extent they can be seen as systems of gender equality or as systems of traditional 
gender roles in each of these parts. 
But we also need to ask about the level and nature of policy intervention. The Three 
Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Esping-Andersen 1990) are relevant to gender, because 
the Social Democratic countries have had gender equality as well as social equality at 
their heart (Ellingsaeter & Leira 2006). Social democratic regimes have also underpinned 
gender equality with social policies, social spending and social commitment to parents 
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may play a greater role than gender equality.
The welfare modelling business has been very fruitful in comparative debate and 
understanding (Abrahamson 1999). But models are simplifications. The UK has moved 
from male breadwinner assumptions, and from free market ones, in support for ‘universal 
childcare’ under the Labour governments of the period from 1997. Germany’s ‘red-
green’ coalition also changed traditional assumptions about gender roles and families. 
And beliefs – especially among younger people – about gender equality in work and care, 
are often not consonant with their governments’ policies.
Are there alternative scenarios for a more gender equal future in Europe? The Dutch 
Combination Scenario (see below) offers a new vision, in which work is redistributed at 
the household level, with men as well as women envisaged as part-time workers and 
carers. The idea of making men’s lives more like women’s is also at the heart of Fraser’s 
Universal Caregiver model, in which all employees would be assumed to have care 
responsibilities, while developments in civil society would enable care to be shared 
(Fraser 1997). But it is argued here that gender equality needs more systematic support, 
beyond the capacity of civil society. The French working time model also has something 
to contribute to thinking about how to turn the one and a half earner model into a two x 
three-quarter one in which men and women have time to care as well as to work and to 
earn. Government commitments to gender equality need underpinning with regulation of 
time and with social investment. Comparative data clearly show that Scandinavian social 
democratic countries are the most gender equal: but they have still prioritized women’s 
employment over men’s care.  In a model of Universal Citizenship gender equality would 
go beyond paid employment – important as that has been – and attend to gender 
inequalities in care, time, income and power: men’s and women’s obligations to paid 
work and care as citizens would be underpinned by regulation of working time and
electoral systems and by social investment in citizenship rights.
Gender in paid work
Policies for equal opportunities in employment have been part of the EU agenda since the 
Treaty of Rome in 1957 brought a commitment to equal pay for men and women. More 
recently an employment strategy has focused on women’s employment, with
participation targets agreed at the Lisbon summit in 2000, including increasing childcare 
provision. At the EU level, increasing women’s employment is widely seen as a key 
policy (Rubery et al 2001, Threlfall 2007), albeit also criticized as market and economic 
growth oriented rather than women and gender-equality oriented (Lewis 2006b).
At the nation-state level, policies of member states are constrained by EU directives, and 
by commitments to meet agreed Lisbon targets through the Open Method of Co-
ordination. For new member states, joining the EU has meant accepting these 
agreements. European countries are therefore widely committed to increasing women’s 
employment. While EU policy has been to draw women into the labour market, which 
brings some convergence over time towards a dual worker model, there remain great 
differences between men and women, particularly in the quality of their employment, as 
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market participation.
The literature suggests several ways to make cross-national comparisons in gender 
differences in employment to illuminate differences in welfare regimes (especially Korpi 
2000, Van der Lippe & Van Dijk 2002, Daly and Rake 2003). Eurostat structural 
indicators allow comparison of gender gaps in employment and unemployment, and 
gender pay gaps across EU member states. Does women’s increasing employment
participation in Western countries bring equality in security, in women’s ability to 
support themselves in the context of family change? And do changes in former state 
socialist countries represent generally increasing insecurity, or re-traditionalization, with 
women’s employment marginalized in favour of men’s?
[Table 1 around here]
In Western Europe, women’s increasing employment has been closing the gap, but was 
still 15.5% below the male employment rate of 72.9%. Those countries with strong and 
long-established support for a dual earner model have the highest women’s employment 
rates, with Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Iceland all over 70%, while Sweden has the
lowest gender employment gap at 4.0%. At the other extreme, Malta’s employment rate
for women of 33.7% and gender employment gap of 40.1% shows a persistent male 
breadwinner system in a relatively small and new member state (Camilleri-Cassar 2005). 
In other countries with historically strong male breadwinner traditions, women may 
appear to be closing the gap, as, for example in the UK, women’s employment has 
reached 65.9% and is 11.7% behind men’s. But these figures include paid employment 
from one hour per week, and we have to look in more detail at working hours and pay to 
see how far women’s ability to sustain themselves through employment remains below 
men’s.
In the very large part of Europe dominated during the post-war period by state socialism, 
patterns of women’s employment have been quite different. Gender equality under state 
socialism – even more than in other regimes – was about women’s place in the labour 
market, with social investment in childcare and other services. Women’s labour market 
participation was high by international standards, supported by occupational welfare: at 
the point of transition from state socialism in 1989, it was over 80% in the Baltic States, 
and Czechoslovakia, somewhat lower in Hungary and Poland, but everywhere well above 
France or the UK. At the point of political and economic transformation dual earner 
households were well established: women were in full time employment, with earnings 
not far below men’s (UNICEF 1999). Has economic restructuring dominated, with 
markets putting gender politics in a back seat (Einhorn 2006)?  In so far as policies 
supporting women’s employment survive the transition from state socialism - how well 
do state socialist practices work in a capitalist market place? 
Among post-state socialist countries, the highest level of women’s employment is 
currently in Estonia, with 62.1%, with Slovenia close behind, while women’s 
employment is particularly low in Poland, at 46.8%. These figures show an enormous 
change in women’s employment compared with the soviet era. But the transformation 
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gender employment gaps below the EU average: even Poland, where women’s 
employment is at its lowest, has a gap between women and men of 12.1%. This is well 
above Sweden’s (4.0%), but below the gender employment gap in Ireland (18.6%) or 
Malta (40.1%). In this respect the dual earner model appears alive and well in CEE 
countries, with more equal participation in employment between men and women than in 
the EU 15, and a much lower gap than in countries with a male breadwinner tradition, 
such as Ireland and Malta.
[Table 2 around here]
Across the EU 27, greater insecurity of paid work for women is indicated by an 
unemployment rate for women of 8.8%%, while men’s is 7.1%. It had been particularly 
feared that the changing economic landscape in post-state socialist regimes would see 
women’s jobs marginalized in favour of men’s. But men have also been vulnerable to 
losing jobs in the transformation process, and gender gaps in unemployment are not in 
practice higher in post-state socialist countries than elsewhere. Poland’s experience is the 
worst in Europe, with women’s unemployment at 15.1%, but men’s also very high at 
13.1%.
[Table 3 around here]
Gender pay gaps in hourly earnings show women across EU countries women earning on 
average15% less per hour than men. Germany’s pay gap is among the highest, at 22%, 
which might be expected from a country with conservative gender traditions; the UK’s 
pay gap (20%) is above the EU average, reflecting its male breadwinner traditions and its 
preference for free markets. But Sweden and Denmark also show above average pay 
gaps, resulting from their segregated labour markets. Somewhat lower pay gaps appear in 
former state socialist countries, with Slovenia’s at 8%, again suggesting that, while levels 
of employment are much lower than before the transformation, women’s employment is 
closer to men’s than it is in Western countries.
On a number of measures of job quality, women in Europe have a worse experience of 
work than men. The share of European women in low paying occupations is nearly twice 
that of men (Weiler 2005). Occupational segregation did not disappear under state 
socialism, but the labour market is less segregated in the east than the west, with more 
women in higher-level categories, as managers, and in technical occupations and skilled 
workers, and fewer in service and sales. There is also a higher proportion of women in 
higher paid jobs: 41% of women full time workers in the (then) acceding and candidate 
countries, compared with 20 % of full timers in the EU 15 (Paoli and Parent-Thirion 
2003: 73-74). We ask below about part-time work (under Time) to help us to unravel the 
extent to which women are able to support themselves and about work-family 
reconciliation policies (under Care) such as parental leave.
Women’s participation in employment has been growing in Western Europe, but it is still 
below men’s; in former state socialist countries, the transformation has indeed damaged 
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employment than had once been feared (Fodor 2005) and are a little more equal with men 
on most measures of work quality than their Western peers. But across Europe, the 
quality of women’s jobs is below men’s with a pay gap in hourly earnings averaging 
15%, segregated labour markets and under-representation in higher-level positions. While 
EU nations are all committed to increasing women’s employment, and to equal pay, there 
are great variations between nation states in the effectiveness with which they are 
achieving these. Social democratic countries sustain women’s employment more 
systematically and effectively than elsewhere, though with deeply segregated labour 
markets, and lower pay for women, while former state socialist countries also have 
somewhat more equal employment than countries with a rooted male breadwinner 
tradition.
Incomes
Women are clearly seeking a more equal opportunity to earn, as they have increased their 
labour market participation, with or without support from governments. In 
individualizing societies, with increasing insecurity of relationships, and risk of divorce, 
earning is crucial to security. Equal pay, a fairer share of quality work, decent minimum 
wage levels, and sufficiency of work for self-support have been sought by women’s 
movements in Western Europe, and are increasingly necessary everywhere. While 
governments have promised these, the reality is that women’s earnings are below men’s, 
even on an hourly basis, and on a lifetime basis, in some countries they may be much 
below men’s. For example, in the UK, despite increasing employment, and changing 
government assumptions about gender, women’s lifetime earnings are around half men’s 
(Rake 2000). Social supports for families, against risk of unemployment, and for 
pensions in old age, are crucial to women’s security, as well as to gender equality.
The European Union regulates but does not play a direct role in designing and 
implementing the redistributive systems of member states, and has relatively small social 
budgets. But there are shared social objectives, with a social cohesion agenda established 
at the Lisbon summit in 2000, to be achieved through the Open Method of Co-ordination. 
While many critics see the Open Method as too open, these developments can be seen as 
a positive commitment to social policy and redistribution. National governments are “not 
free to determine the objectives of redistributive policy … their freedom lies solely in the 
choice of means towards commonly agreed ends” (Atkinson 2003). Social ideals have 
been turned into social indicators, with structural indicators on social inclusion, including 
poverty and income inequality with all indicators available by gender. While we may 
debate how effectively this social agenda will be implemented, we can use the indicators 
to understand how different now are European member states achievements in reducing 
poverty and inequality.
Exploring how regimes deal with poverty among men and women enables understanding 
of differences between them. Structural indicators allow us – in Table 4 - to compare 
poverty, before and after transfers, for representative regimes. These set the threshold at 
60% of national equivalised median disposable income showing relative poverty: it is 
important to note that absolute standards of living in former state socialist countries are 
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well below the EU average. We might expect that countries with social security systems 
designed on the male breadwinner model, as the UK Beveridge system was, would be 
less successful in dealing with poverty among women than countries where women’s 
employment is more established and supported by tax and benefit structures.
[Insert Table 4 around here]
A high risk of poverty among women and men appears as common in countries as 
different as Sweden, Denmark, the UK and Ireland, all with over 30% of women at risk 
of poverty. The risk of poverty before transfers is just greater on average in the EU 25 for 
women than for men. Overall, the impact of social transfers was to reduce poverty from 
27% of women to 17% and from 25% of men to 15%. While welfare states reduced the 
risk of poverty, they did not – overall - reduce the gender gap. The main differences in 
welfare states are the extent to which they reduce the risks of poverty rather than the 
extent to which they reduce the gender gap in poverty risk. Sweden’s very active welfare 
state reduces poverty risk among women from 30% to 10%, the lowest among the EU 
countries, though Iceland (not an EU member) had a post-transfer figure of 9%.  Slovenia 
and Hungary, among the post-state socialist country examples, reduce women’s risk of 
poverty to levels similar to these Social Democratic countries, at 11% and 13% 
respectively, while Poland leaves 20% of women at risk of poverty after transfers, figures 
comparable to the male breadwinner examples the UK (19%) and Ireland (21%).
These data show the great importance of welfare states’ role in reducing the risk of 
poverty. Social support for families is also crucial for women, who are still likely to 
assume responsibility for care, despite changing ideals. Family allowances are 
particularly important to women in protecting family living standards with or without a 
male breadwinner. The state-socialist tradition, in which family benefits have formed a 
high proportion of family incomes and of GDP, has been a crucial support to 
motherhood, as well as keeping children out of poverty. Pressures on government 
spending, from international agencies and inflation, brought lower values and more 
targeting after the transformation. By the end of the 1990s, the typical pattern in Central 
Europe was for high coverage, but much lower value in relation to household income and 
GDP than had been usual under communism. In Hungary, family allowances were 8.1% 
of household income in 1991 and 3.8% in 1999, while in Poland they fell from 4.2% to 
1.2% (UNICEF 2001: 42-4). Means-testing of family allowances in the Czech Republic, 
Poland and Slovenia, brings a more stringent and contingent system of support, with 
means-testing of childcare benefits also in Poland (Förster and Tóth 2001, MISSOC 
2004). But protection for children and their parents remains strong by western standards, 
with the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland more successful than the UK and USA in 
using taxes and transfers to keep children out of poverty, as evidenced in various ways by 
the succession of Innocenti Research Centre Report Cards on child poverty and well-
being in richer countries. Scandinavian countries fill most of the top places in the last of 
these reports (UNICEF 2001, 2005, 2007).
Pension reform – East and West - has brought trends towards individualisation (against 
rights through partners), towards equalization of pension ages, towards closer connection 
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between contribution and benefits, for privatisation and against redistribution. Equalising 
pension ages, and making benefits depend more closely on individual contributions, 
rather than on entitlements through partners may appear to offer gender equality: but 
these will only bring gender equality in old age if there is gender equality in working life 
and caring life. There are many threats to older women’s security in these changes: the 
gender pay gap, giving time to motherhood, increasing divorce, women’s tendency to live 
longer may all bring reduced protection and pensions to women. Women are increasingly 
being assumed to be able to earn their own pensions, but without sufficient attention to 
the processes that bring lower pay and capacity to contribute. These trends towards 
individualising risk and away from more socially oriented pooling of risk ‘threaten to 
magnify gender inequality in later life income’ (Ginn et al 2001: 230).
The great diversity of European systems of social support is reflected in measures of how 
successfully they are meeting needs in the context of family change and increasing 
insecurity, both in Western countries as well as in the post-state socialist societies. Across 
the EU 25 women were somewhat more exposed to poverty than men. But the 
Scandinavian countries, are achieving most in reducing these risks. Women in the post-
state socialist countries have high risks of poverty, but state structures to reduce these 
have been better sustained through the transformation period than many feared.
Care Work
Women’s employment in paid work has been shaped and constrained by their unpaid care 
work as mothers and carers. Everywhere in Europe women are more likely to be mothers, 
with primary responsibility for care, while men are more likely to be paid workers, with 
primary responsibility for employment. These patterns have been challenged and 
changed, and there is some convergence between men’s and women’s work (Gershuny 
2000). But gender inequalities in care responsibilities and time are persistent and 
important factors underlying women’s unequal position in labour markets of European 
countries. Here we ask about social policy support for care in and outside the family and 
for changing the gender relations of care in the family. Even in social democratic 
countries, policies for enabling women to do more paid work have been more extensive 
than policies for encouraging men to do more unpaid care work. In state socialist 
countries, women were conceived as workers and brought into the labour force. But this 
was done by state support for women’s care work, and not by transforming the domestic 
division of labour, which remained unchallenged in soviet times by government or by 
feminist influences.
European childcare policy has been less developed than employment policy, but childcare
is increasingly being seen in the EU as a pre-requisite for increasing employment, which 
is itself a strong priority.  Current EU targets are for one third of under-threes and 90% of 
children from three to mandatory school age to have access to childcare by 2010, but only 
the Scandinavian countries are thought likely to meet these targets (Ellingsaeter and Leira 
2006). National systems are varied. The most universal, supply-side childcare systems of 
the Scandinavian countries, particularly Sweden and Denmark stand out in quality 
measures for childcare, especially for younger children: Sweden has University educated 
staff, high staffing ratios, with public funding at 100% for pre-school and 75% for 
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younger children. Public childcare covers 87% - 96% of 2-, 3-, 4- and 5- year-olds
(Gornick & Meyers 2003, Nyberg 2004, 2006, Plantenga & Siegel 2005). Post-socialist 
countries have lost state and employer support for nursery-age children, but provision and 
support for pre-school children remain strong. Hungary’s provision is strongest among 
these, with kindergarten enrolments sustained at 85% to 88% of 3-6 year-olds throughout 
the transition period (UNICEF TransMONEE database). Hungary’s family support 
system – including family allowances and kindergartens – is close to the Nordic model, 
with extensive public responsibility, and has remained comparatively stable through 
political changes because people see children’s care as a social responsibility (Szikra 
2005: 12, 2006: 16).
Elsewhere in Western Europe public support for childcare and coverage are more limited. 
While in Sweden and Denmark, coverage for 0-3-year-olds is already twice the EU target 
(each with around two-thirds children), France is just short of the one-third target, and the 
UK and Germany have places for around 10% of the population or below. Coverage for 
pre-school children is higher, but often part-time (Plantenga & Siegel 2005: 14). The 
assumption of maternal care and responsibility may be strong, whether because family 
care is assumed to be better for children, or because parents are thought best able to make 
market choices. In the UK, until the end of the twentieth century mothers were assumed 
to be responsible for children: most fitted employment around children’s needs. Current 
policy is for a mixed economy, which makes access and quality uncertain. Problems of 
trustworthiness, supply and affordability of childcare places still encourage discontinuous 
and part-time employment, especially among less qualified mothers (Lewis 2003). And 
for pre-school children the UK’s 2.5-hour day is among Europe’s lowest provision, 
contrasting with France, which has allowed mothers to choose employment more easily, 
partly through stronger public educational provision, with a pre-school day from 8.30 to 
4.30. The UK’s provision shows its male breadwinner history, despite ten years of 
government support for childcare and public funding through tax credits.
Childcare leave to enable parents to care for nursery-age children has been a strong 
feature of former state socialist countries. In 2002, the Czech Republic had the longest 
parental leave in Europe, until the child is four years old. At transition, as workplace 
nurseries closed, childcare leave schemes were made more attractive. Parents in the 
Czech Republic may have rights to four years’ leave, but they also suffer ‘a gradual 
erosion in the value of their qualifications and previous work experience, and find it more 
difficult to return to their jobs after such a long break’, while childcare benefit is set at 
one fifth of average incomes and brings the risk of poverty (Kocourkova 2002). Shorter 
leaves may offer a better fit between the needs of children for parental care, the needs of 
parents to earn, and the requirements of gender equality (Gornick and Meyers 2003).
The Swedish system has been based on shorter periods of leave, which are strongly 
supported, with 80% income replacement: now 480 days of parental leave, which can be 
used flexibly on a full-time or part-time basis. This allows parents to care for their 
children at home for 16 months on average, before using other forms of childcare 
(Duvander et al 2005: 13). After this public support for childcare is extensive, as we have 
seen. Sweden’s leave system has been rated as highest in Europe if measuring ‘effective 
parental leave’, to take account of payment levels, with Hungary close behind, Finland 
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and the Czech Republic following.  By this measure, Germany and France are middle 
range countries, with the UK just above Ireland and the Netherlands, which have the 
shortest periods of effectively supported leave. Sweden also has one of the shortest gaps 
between the end of effective parental leave and pre-primary admission age (Plantenga & 
Siegel 2005: 9-11). Parents in Sweden also have a right to work reduced hours – 30 hours 
per week – until their children are twelve. Thus, Sweden’s flexible system allows parents 
to stay at home during the first year and more, on high levels of replacement income. 
Along with other Scandinavian countries, these systems sustain women’s labour market 
participation in a more continuous manner, and with stronger levels of social support, 
than other European countries.
So far, most parental leave policies have been designed to protect mothers and children 
through childbirth, and enable mothers to balance childcare with employment. While 
these arrangements have brought important benefits to mothers and children, they have 
also put mothers into a more vulnerable position in the labour market. Can parental 
leaves can be designed to support gender equality in employment, underpinned by 
increasing gender equality in care, rather than just supporting maternal employment?
Commitments to men’s participation in care work are much weaker than European and 
nation states’ commitments to increasing women’s participation in paid employment. But 
since the 1996 European Parental Leave Directive, member states have been obliged to 
provide fathers’ entitlement to care time (three months but unpaid) after the birth of a 
child, as well as mothers’. Scandinavian countries, beginning with Norway, had been 
developing stronger entitlements, to a paid, non-transferable Daddy month to give fathers 
an incentive to take parental leave. Sweden borrowed this policy in 1995, increasing the 
month to two in 2002. Currently, Iceland has the most developed policy, with a 3 x 3 
system: three months for the mother, three for the father, and three for sharing between 
them. These policies are also the most effective in Scandinavia. They have encouraged a 
rapid increase in fathers’ taking a share of parental leave, with three-quarters taking their 
three-month quota. Scandinavian parents are subject to contradictory pressures too, to 
work long hours, and fathers still take only a small proportion of parental leaves in 
Nordic countries, (Nyberg 2004, 2006, Ellingsaeter and Leira 2006, Lammi-Taskula 
2006). However modest in effect, these are important changes, bringing new assumptions 
about men as fathers, in households as well as among policy-makers. European policy for 
work-family balance has put gender at home on the agenda as well as gender at work, but 
it has been a new year/new millenium resolution (Council of the European Union 2000) 
rather than a comprehensive commitment.
Beliefs about gender equality in care show widespread agreement that childcare should 
belong equally to men and women. Respondents across 28 countries (including Turkey, a 
candidate country) were asked about: playing, taking children to activities, dealing with 
nappies dressing, taking to the doctor, helping with schoolwork, reading, buying toys, 
publishing, putting to bed, answering important questions. The resulting index (from 
zero, wholly unshared) to 100 (fully shared) suggests that beliefs in gender equality in 
care are widespread in Western, Central and Eastern Europe, with an overall index of 
81.8 in the EU 15 and of 76.6 in the new member countries: ‘most people of Europe 
believe that childcare is basically a non-specific task: both mother and father are expected 
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to carry out childrearing’ (Fahey and Spéder 2004: 60). Beliefs and practice may of 
course be very different, and some degree of disjuncture is to be expected between what 
people say they think should happen in childcare, and what actually does.
Fathers themselves have been spending more time on parenting, with paternal time now 
between a quarter and a third of maternal time (Eurostat 2004). However, this varies 
widely across countries, with very low levels of paternal time in Greece and Portugal.
There is some evidence of greater gender equality in post-socialist households, with 31% 
of men involved in raising and caring for children, in the (then) Acceding and Candidate 
Countries, compared with 24% in the EU 15 (Paoli and Parent-Thirion, 2003: 78).  In 
social democratic countries there is some evidence of fathers influenced by father-
friendly legislation, with parental leave rights for fathers (not just to their families) and 
government encouragement to use them. But in liberal, free-market countries fathers may 
also contribute more time to their children, in response to an absence of social support
(Smith 2004, Smith and Williams 2007).
European systems of support for childcare show great variety. In most countries mothers 
are still primary carers, and fathers are primary breadwinners, even where governments 
have established social rights for children’s care.  Scandinavian countries are clear 
leaders in parental rights and childcare services. But the systems of post-state socialist 
countries are less damaged than commentators have feared: nurseries have closed, but 
parents have rights to leave for nursery-age children and pre-school provision remains 
strong. The European Union’s emphasis on increasing women’s employment has 
supported childcare development, mainly through encouragement and targets, which are 
establishing new norms. Policies to encourage fathers to play a stronger role in childcare 
are beginning, but for the most part policy-makers follow the widespread belief in gender 
equality in this respect rather than leading it.
Time
Time is integral to gender systems: traditional male breadwinner regimes depended on 
men’s full-time and lifetime paid employment. Britain’s post-war social security system
was devised by Beveridge on this model of a male working life, while allowing for 
married women to be full-time carers, dependent on their husbands for income and 
pension contributions. The working time models that have emerged from the ashes of the 
male breadwinner model – most often one and a half earner, with mothers in part-time 
work – have rarely brought gender equality in time (Lewis 2001a). Even in the weakest 
male breadwinner states, women do shorter hours of paid work than men, and longer 
hours of unpaid. In contrast, state socialist working time regimes meant full-time work 
for men and women: parental leaves and non-competitive conditions, allowed mothers to 
exit and re-enter work to meet their children’s needs. Both time systems now bring risks 
to parents, as mothers can no longer rely on marriage and male breadwinners to bring 
security, income or pensions, while post-state socialist countries bring competitive 
conditions in which women cannot safely use their rights. Increasingly, policy strategies 
include time regulation.
15
Hours for full-time employees are nearly gender equal, with a 41-hour week for men and 
39-hour week for women in the EU 25: gender differences are greatest in the UK, where 
men’ working week is 44 hours, four hours longer than women’s, while Sweden, 
Bulgaria and Luxembourg record equal full-time working hours (Eurostat 2007). The 
major gender differences in Western European countries are in part-time work, which is 
the way that women in countries with a male breadwinner tradition have joined the labour 
market, fitting paid work around unpaid care responsibilities. In the (mainly western)
countries covered by Eurostat (2004) women aged 20 to 74 spent more time on domestic 
work than on paid work, while the opposite was the case for men.
Working time arrangements in former state socialist countries are distinctive. First, 
working hours are longer than in the EU15, averaging 44 hours rather than 38. Second, 
very long working weeks are commoner, 38% working more than 45 hours a week, 
against 21% in the EU15. Thirdly, fewer people work short hours, fewer work part-time, 
and part-time hours are long, at 32 hours on average (Paoli and Parent-Thirion 2003: 45). 
There is more gender equality in working time in these new member states than in Malta, 
but this kind of gender equality makes reconciling work and family a challenge, 
especially for mothers. There is little debate about working time in the new CEE member 
states, or making space for women or men to engage in care: employees need full-time 
incomes for living standards and future pensions. Working time is also less flexible than 
the EU15 (Weiler 2005). These countries appear to follow their state socialist 
predecessors: men and women are expected to be in the labour market, equally in full 
time jobs with long full time hours. But the conditions under which they do this have 
become more challenging, with inflexibility and competition for jobs. Now mothers find 
difficulty using parental leaves, or re-entering after childbirth. While men appear to be 
playing a more serious role in these obligations, they are still primarily mothers’ 
obligations, bringing serious difficulties in keeping jobs and caring for children (Pascall 
& Kwak 2005).
[Insert Table 5 here]
Women’s part-time work is a crucial way in which they may be marginalized and 
disadvantaged by caring responsibilities (Rubery 1998, 1999). Very high levels of 
insecure, low paid work, with short hours and limited rights: these were one of Jane 
Lewis’ key reasons for describing the UK as a strong male breadwinner model, while 
Swedish women were likely to do part-time work, but with longer hours and conditions 
equivalent to full-time work (Lewis 1992). The EU Part-Time Work Directive has 
improved rights, but part-time work remains one way UK women bend their employment 
to their family, and suffer the consequences in terms of life-time earnings half men’s 
(Rake 2000). In Western Europe, 33.5% of total employment is women’s part-time, over 
five times men’s. Table 5 shows how much part-time work is women’s work. The ratios 
of women’s part-time employment to men’s show women in Western Europe with around 
five times the rate for men, and even Sweden around three times. Distinctive differences 
between East and West also persist here. Poland’s women part-timers contribute the 
highest rate to total employment among post-state socialist countries at 13.4%, but this is 
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much below western countries, and further below traditionally male breadwinner 
countries, the UK and Ireland.
What routes are there to more equal working time? The Swedish route has been to 
support full-time employment – or nearly full-time employment  - for women and men 
within a dual earner model, through high public spending on childcare and parental rights 
and leaves. These include the right to a six-hour working day for parents of young 
children, introduced in Sweden in 1979. One consequence of parental rights introduced in 
the 1970s has been a deeply divided labour market, in which women are more likely to 
use parental leave and to work shorter hours, and to have lower paid public sector jobs. 
More recent policy developing strategies – including dedicated ‘Daddy leave’ in the 
1990s - to encourage men to use parental leave has been one response, with the 
assumption that both paid and care work should be shared. Among Nordic countries 
Sweden is seen as coming the nearest now to a model which facilitates ‘the dual-darner, 
care-sharing family, in which both mothers and fathers are economic providers and carers 
for children’ (Leira 2006: 44).
A part-time route to more equal working time has been pursued by the Netherlands. The 
‘Polder model’ adopted part-time work for economic goals, to share employment, and 
enabled the absorption of women into the economy, but was not specifically a model for 
gender equality. However, the ‘Combination Scenario’ - adopted as a guideline for work 
and family policies in 1995 - brought an ideological commitment to gender equality in 
care work as well as paid employment, challenging ‘not only women’s gender position 
but also men’s’ (Knijn 2001: 170, Knijn & Selten 2002). Part-time work was integral to 
the ‘Combination Scenario’ whose core concepts are the equal valuation of unpaid care 
work with paid employment, a balanced combination of care and paid work, and gender 
equality in both care and paid employment. In the Netherlands, women’s move into part-
time work has been rapid. Men’s part-time work has increased, but as younger and older 
workers rather than as parents (Plantenga 2002). Both men and women in the the 
Netherlands have the highest part-time rates in Europe, but women’s at 75.1% is over 
three times men’s at 22.6%. The official ideal is still far from reality, and the Netherlands 
is a distinctive version of the Western European norm of a one and a half work pattern, 
with women as the half, rather than transforming the gender division of time.
A shorter working week, making more room for care, is an alternative strategy for gender 
equality, with policies in several Western European countries. France has national 
legislation for a maximum 35-hour working week, beginning in larger firms in 2000 and 
in smaller firms in 2002. As in the Netherlands, this started as a policy to share 
employment, at a time of high unemployment, but more equal sharing of paid and unpaid 
work in families was also an objective (Fagnani & Letablier 2004, 2006). Despite 
significant difficulties, especially for low earners, early research suggests that the 35-hour 
week enables work-family reconciliation. Among parents with at least one child under 
six, 59.5% of women and 55.2% of men replied that the 35-hour week law had made 
reconciling their working life and family life easier (Fagnani and Letablier 2006: 86). 
Parents were more positive when working within a family-friendly working climate, 
reducing hours on a weekly basis (71% positive), and – in the context of legislation not 
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fully implemented at the time of this research - actually working near to the 35-hour 
norm (65% positive). Negative responses were associated with employers not being 
perceived as family-friendly, reduced working time not arranged to produce a 35-hour 
week (instead being annualised and giving longer holidays), or working hours above the 
35-hour norm (Fagnani and Letablier 2004: 560-566). In another study, public sector 
employees with children under 12 are reported as spending more time with their children: 
90% of fathers and 87% of mothers (Fagnani & Letablier 2006). There is also evidence of 
preferences for more equal working time, with the current French model not far from 
widespread preferences in Europe (Fagan & Warren 2001).
These three routes could be characterised as Sweden making women’s working lives as 
far as possible like men’s, the Netherlands making men’s working lives more like 
women’s, while France offers a mid-point between men’s lives and women’s.  In 
Western countries some residue of the male breadwinner model remains, as men are more 
tied to their jobs and women more tied to childcare, but this varies a great deal. Sweden is 
clearly the leading country, in Scandinavia and in Europe: here gender equality policy is 
the most deep-rooted, with rights for parents developing since the 1970s, and a strong 
women’s movement. Incentives for men to care since the 1990s mean that Sweden now 
offers official and financial support for men to care as well as for women’s employment.
Gender and power
Gender systems are also systems of power: welfare states affect gender relations, 
women’s autonomy as individuals, their ability to support themselves and their place in 
public politics. Equality legislation has brought women important rights, but inequalities 
in paid work, care, income and time bring unequal voice in households, civil society, 
local politics, state and European governments. In households the continuing gender 
division of labour suggests that women’s voice is weaker, and their lower incomes may 
give them less say in major decisions than men. Women’s political representation in 
national parliaments has been shown to relate positively to their level of employment, 
education compared with men, length of time since enfranchisement, secularization, 
social democratic political parties and electoral systems based on proportional 
representation. But even where women’s employment, education and mobilization have 
brought steady improvements in representation, these have not brought parity with men.
Increasingly women’s low level of political representation is being targeted by quotas 
(Dahlerup 2006, 2007).
Women’s representation in European parliaments (EU 25) is now 23% on average, 
despite commitments to international conventions such as CEDAW, and EU persuasion 
to member states to increase representation of women in decision-making positions. 
Countries vary widely, from Sweden’s 45% to Malta’s 9%. On this measure, Germany is 
somewhat above average, and the UK and France somewhat below. Malta shares its low 
position in women’s representation with Ireland, another traditionally male breadwinner 
state, and with former state socialist countries, Hungary and Romania, which also have 
around 10% women in their parliaments.
[Insert table 6 around here]
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Restriction of social, civil and political action under state socialism limited women’s 
politics, and challenges to patriarchal families from within (Molyneux 1990: 44-8). But 
the democratization that came with the end of soviet authority has been a gendered 
process and has not opened space for women’s participation to the same extent as men’s. 
Amid all the priorities of economic upheavals and the development of class differences, 
gender and women’s political action may have taken a back seat (Ferge 1997, 1998, 
Watson 1997, 2000). Women tend to be doing better in civil service positions, with 
several countries above the EU average, and Slovenia exceeding Sweden’s 
representation. Women’s position in employment, perhaps the legacy of state socialism, 
appears to give them better access to decision-making within government departments 
than in many western countries, while access to formal political positions is more 
restricted. Accession to the EU has put gender equality on the political agenda of post-
state socialist countries, and is enabling civil action. But gender equality as a political 
norm, and the civil action to achieve it in post-socialist countries have still a distance to 
travel.
Accumulated evidence points to discriminatory processes as the key to women’s 
continued under-representation, rather than women’s choices or poorer qualification for 
election (Phillips 1991). In this case solutions may be found through changing political 
processes. Proponents of the parity principle argue democratic representation is not 
democratic unless both men and women are equally represented. Proposals for gender 
quotas come in many forms, and are designed to ensure a minimum proportion of women 
are elected, or to give parity between men and women. A ‘parity law’ has been used in 
France to regulate the proportion of women candidates in local regional and European 
elections, though not in national parliamentary ones: it increased women’s representation 
from 22 per cent to 47.5 per cent in the cities in March 2001 (Squires and Wickham-
Jones 2001).
Nordic countries are used to being at the top of gender leagues. They have adopted 
strategies to foster more equal representation of women in parliaments. The long, 
unbroken women’s movement has worked to increase acceptability of stronger women’s 
participation and the unacceptability of men’s over-representation. Women’s stronger 
position in employment, proportional representation, social democratic party dominance 
and party quotas – though not compulsory legal quotas - have increased women’s 
representation in parliamentary politics. This has been gradual process built on 
consensual politics over decades. Sweden is still at the top of European countries, with its 
45% of women parliamentarians. But Nordic feminists are now surprised to find their
position at the top of the international league taken by Rwanda, bringing debates in 
Scandinavia about whether the consensual process has been too gradual (Dahlerup 2006, 
2007, Freidenvall et al 2006). New parliaments in Scotland and Wales have also offered 
opportunities to build systems in which women can win seats in Europe too (albeit at a 
devolved rather than UK level) and have reached 50% in Wales. Quotas are rapidly 
growing as a means to avoid a hundred-year wait for women to be fully represented, 
though they face barriers in some developed democracies, particularly those without 
proportional representation, with entrenched male MPs and party selection processes, and 
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where the dominant ideology is based on liberal ideals emphasizing equal opportunity 
rather than equality of result.
Women’s political representation in formal politics is clearly below men’s. But there are 
great differences. Scandinavian countries remain the leaders in Europe from women’s 
point of view, with women in Sweden challenging men in parliamentary representation, 
while Malta and Ireland have the fewest women in parliamentary politics. Women in 
former state socialist countries have had a disappointing transition to democracy, in their 
relatively low position in parliamentary politics. However, the tradition of women’s 
employment does allow women in post-state socialist countries to achieve influential 
civil service positions, while the EU is enabling the development of women’s 
organizations (and others) in civil society. The EU has offered advice to member states 
over increasing women’s representation, but no binding directive: quota debates suggest a 
practical means to increasing women’s representation at EU and national levels, to which 
in theory governments are committed.
Conclusion
The gender models underpinning state socialist societies in Eastern Europe, and the male 
breadwinner model in Western Europe have been challenged by social and economic 
transformation in the east, and by family change and individualisation across Europe. The 
soviet tradition was one of relative gender equality, particularly in employment, 
underpinned by social spending on children and families. Transformation has brought 
markets, and has reduced, but not destroyed the social systems that supported women’s 
employment. In Western Europe, women have challenged the male breadwinner model 
by entering the labour market. But they have done so with very varied levels of state 
support, which has brought very different levels of gender equality and the ability of
women to support themselves and their children through sustained high-quality 
employment. It has also brought very different power in national – and probably domestic 
- decision-making.
Analysing the male breadwinner model into its component parts – paid word, care work, 
income, time and power – allows us to compare countries with very different histories, to 
understand social policies across different elements. In any likely future scenario, 
European women are likely to want and need a stronger and more equal position in paid 
employment. But work is not the whole. Greater equality in paid employment will not 
bring gender equality unless greater attention is paid to gender differences in care, 
income, time and power.
We also need to consider the different qualities of regimes in terms of their commitments 
to intervention at different levels: to influencing the household division of labour, as well 
as to social spending and to equality. While European countries are all committed in 
principle to gender equality, their achievements are very different. This may be partly
understood in terms of competing commitments to markets and to traditional families. 
The UK may be seen as a liberal example (though not an entirely consistent one) of 
commitments to markets often winning over commitments to gender equality, which has 
made gender equality a privilege for better-off and better educated women who can 
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afford to pay for care. Germany’s conservative tradition may be seen as limiting its 
commitment to changing gender roles in families and outside them (again not entirely 
consistently). Among post-state socialist countries, Poland’s commitment to traditional 
families has also brought more inequality, while Slovenia is more like the social 
democratic countries. Only the Scandinavian social democratic countries have made an 
ideological commitment to gender equality, supported by social spending, which puts 
them at the forefront in Europe for social policies designed to produce gender equality in 
employment, care, income, time and power, and in measures of these in practice. Even 
here there are costs to women in segregated employment, with lower pay than men’s.
It will not be news to anyone interested in gender and welfare states that, while all 
European governments are committed to gender equality, the Nordic countries achieve it 
more consistently than elsewhere. But the evidence of the superiority of the Scandinavian 
model is now clarified by the structural indicators, which allow comparison across the 
wider Europe. Evidence also accumulates of the superiority of Scandinavian model in 
broader economic and social measures, as well as the child poverty data already 
mentioned (UNICEF 2007). In Choosing to Grow, reporting on the Lisbon Strategy, the 
Commission points to Swede, Denmark and Finland as consistently best performers, in 
terms of general economic performance, employment, research and innovation, economic 
reform, social cohesion and the environment (European Commission 2003b: 29).  Similar 
conclusions are drawn by Goodin (1999) and by Panić, who compares seven contrasting 
regimes using a wide range of measures: ‘The best performing industrial economies at 
the beginning of the 21st century are those that have least in common with the neo-liberal 
model’: the Scandinavian social democracies in particular (Panić 2007).
The European Union is committed to gender equality in Europe, and may bring 
convergence between its different member states. Gender equality in employment has 
been part of the EU since the Treaty of Rome in 1957. Debates about gender equality in 
Europe have been lively and effective in developing wider commitments by member 
states. But the European Union is not a consistent supporter of social Europe, often 
emphasizing markets, economic growth and employment rather than social objectives.
And while member states are committed to increasing women’s labour market 
participation, childcare and so on, many fear that current commitments may not be relied 
upon.
As the structures which underpinned state socialist and male breadwinner models have 
both transformed, new structures are needed in Europe. In Nordic countries as in the rest 
of Europe, gender equality policies have tended to start with women’s employment, and 
have been much more active in supporting women’s work than in supporting men’s care. 
Scandinavian countries are now developing policies to encourage gender equality in care 
as well as in employment, and give the best lead towards a more gender-equal future in 
Europe. A Universal Citizenship model – in which men’s and women’s rights and 
obligations to care were recognised and supported - would emphasise the need to change 
men’s employment as well as women’s, to give men and women time to earn to support 
themselves. The research and policy agenda begins to include men as fathers and carers, 
with models such as the Netherlands’ Combination Scenario and Scandinavian Daddy 
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leave. But policies for gender equality are hindered by gender inequality in decision-
making, especially in politics, which could be transformed by quotas. The evidence about
European people’s desire for more equal working time, and belief in more equal 
obligations, is that Europeans are ahead of their policy makers in support for gender 
equality as more equal obligation and time to care and not just as increasing women’s 
participation in employment
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Table 1: Female and male employment rates, as percentage of women and
men aged 15 to 64, and difference between male and female, 20051
Employment rate: 
female
Employment rate: 
male
Employment rate
Male – female
Sweden 70.4 74.4  4.0
Denmark 71.9 79.8  7.9
Slovenia 61.3 70.4  9.1
Hungary 51.0 63.1 12.1
Poland 46.8 58.9 12.1
France 57.6 68.8 11.2
Germany 59.6 71.2 11.6
UK 65.9 77.6 11.7
Ireland 58.3 76.9 18.6
Malta 33.7 73.8 40.1
EU 27 56.0 70.8 14.8
Source: Eurostat structural indicators Europa NewCronos website 2006 and author’s 
calculations
                                                
1 The employment rates are calculated by dividing the number of women aged 15 to 64 in employment by 
the total female population of the same age group. The indicator is based on the EU Labour Force Survey. 
The survey covers the entire population living I private households and excludes those in collective 
households such as boarding houses, halls of residence and hospitals. Employed population consists of 
those persons who during the reference week did any work for pay or profit for at lease one hour, or were 
not working but had jobs from which they were temporarily absent.
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Table 2: Female and male unemployment rates, as percentage of the labour force, and 
difference between male and female, 20061
Unemployment 
rate: female
Unemployment 
rate: male
Unemployment rate 
female – male
Sweden  7.3  6.9  0.4
Denmark  4.5  3.3  1.2
Slovenia  7.2  5.0  2.2
Hungary  7.8  7.2  0.6
Poland 15.1 13.1  2.0
France 10.0  8.2  1.8
Germany  9.1  7.7  1.4
UK  4.3  5.1 -0.8
Ireland  4.1  4.6 -0.5
Malta  9.2  6.5  2.7
EU 27  8.8  7.1  1.7
Source: Eurostat structural indicators Europa NewCronos website 2006, and author’s 
calculations
                                                
1 Unemployment rates represent unemployed persons as a percentage of the labour force = active 
population. The labour force is the total number of people employed and unemployed. Unemployed 
persons comprise persons aged 15 to 74 who were: a without work during the reference week, b. currently 
available for work, i.e. were available for paid employment or self-employment before the end of the two 
weeks following the reference week, c. actively seeing work, i.e. had taken specific steps in the four weeks 
period ending with the reference week to seek paid employment or self-employment or who found a job to 
start later, i.e. within a period of, at most, three months. 
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Table 3: Gender pay gap in unadjusted form, 20051
(Difference between men’s and women’s average gross hourly earnings as a percentage 
of men’s average gross hourly earnings)
Gender Pay Gap
Sweden 16
Denmark 18
Slovenia  8
Hungary 10
Poland 10
France 12
Germany 22
UK 20
Ireland 11  (2004)
Malta  4
EU 25 15
Source: Eurostat structural indicators Europa NewCronos website 2006
                                                
1 Gender pay gap is given as the difference between average gross hourly earnings of male paid employees 
and of female paid employees as a percentage of average gross hourly earnings of male paid employees. 
The population consists of all paid employees aged 16-64 that are ‘at work 15+ hours per week’.
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Table 4: Risk of poverty, before and after transfers, male and female, 2005 (or most 
recent available figures)1
Before 
transfers
Female
After 
transfers
Female
Before 
transfers
Male
After 
transfers 
Male
Before 
transfers 
Female 
–male
After 
transfers 
female -
male
Sweden 30 10 27  9  3  1
Denmark 32 12 29 12  3  0
Slovenia 18 11 15  9  3  2
Hungary 29 13 30 14 -1 -1
Poland 29 20 31 21 -2 -1
France 27 14 25 12  2  2
Germany 25 14 22 12  5  2
UK 30 19 28 18  2  1
Ireland 34 21 30 19  4  2
Malta 22 15 20 14  2  1
EU 25 27 17 25 15  2  2
Source: Eurostat structural indicators, Europa NewCronos website 2007, and author’s 
calculations
                                                
1 The share of women and men with an equivalised disposable income below the risk-of-poverty threshold, 
which is set at 60% of the national median equivalised disposable income.
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Table 5: Part-time workers as percentage of total employment, 2005
Part-time rate: 
female
Part-time rate: male Part-time rate 
female: male
Sweden 39.6 11.5 3.4: 1
Denmark 43.8  7.8 5.6: 1
Slovenia 11.1  7.2 1.5: 1
Hungary  5.8   2.7 2.1: 1
Poland 14.3   8.0 1.8: 1
Netherlands 75.1 22.6 3.3: 1
France 30.7  5.7 5.4: 1
Germany 43.8  7.8 5.6 :1
UK 42.7 10.4 4.1: 1
Ireland (2002) 30.4  6.5 4.7: 1
Malta 21.1  4.5 4.7: 1
Euro area 34.8  6.9 5.0: 1
EU 25 32.4  7.4 4.4: 1
Source: European Commission/Eurostat 2007 Living conditions in Europe (Table 3.2: 46) 
and author’s calculations.
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Table 6: Women in decision-making
Percentage of 
women Senior 
Ministers in 
national 
government
Percentage of 
women 
members of 
single/lower 
house 
Parliaments
Percentage of 
women at one 
level below the 
minister
Percentage 
of women 
at two 
below 
minister
Sweden 52 45 40 45
Slovenia  7 15 41 67
Hungary 12  9  3 23
Poland  6 22 29 31
France 18 13  0 18
Germany 33 33 11  9
UK 27 18 21 18
Ireland 14 13  11 11
Malta 15  9  7 12
Average EU 25 23 23 16 24
Source: European Commission Database on Women and Men in Decision-making 2005
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